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DaviD R. HenDeRson1
a comment on: BenJamin c. alamaR anD stanton a. Glantz, “smoke-fRee 
oRDinances incRease RestauRant PRofit anD value,” Contemporary eConomiC 
poliCy 22 (4): octoBeR 2004, PP. 520-525.
aBstRact
on tHe web site of contempoRaRy economic policy, a jouRnal pub-
lished by the Western Economic Association International, the publisher high-
lights the Best Article Award for 2004. The award was granted to an article by 
Benjamin C. Alamar and Stanton A. Glantz (2004).  
As the title of their article suggests, Alamar and Glantz conclude that 
“Smoke-free Ordinances Increase Restaurant Profit and Value.” The final two 
sentences of the article are as follows:
These results add to the growing body of  literature that should give 
restaurant and bar owners a real economic incentive to support 
smoke-free laws. Despite the rhetoric that smoke-free laws hurt the 
restaurant business, the marketplace indicates that these laws increase 
the profits and the values of  restaurants and bars and are good for 
business. (525)
One naturally wonders: We know that some people like to smoke and pre-
fer restaurants where they can smoke. What about the restaurant that specifically 
caters to smokers? Do Alamar and Glantz say that such a restaurant will benefit 
from a ban on its niche? Or do they mean restaurants on the whole? If “on the 
whole,” have they adequately accounted for the restaurants and would-have-been 
restaurants that lose?
Here I argue that Alamar and Glantz’s article is bad economics. It shows 
1 Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA 93943.
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unsound reasoning, presents empirical findings that do not lead to the authors’ 
conclusions, and omits important considerations. 
The authors note that 35 studies have “concluded that smoke-free policies 
had a negative impact on the hospitality industry; all of them were funded by the 
tobacco industry or organizations affiliated with the tobacco industry” (524). They 
remark repeatedly on tobacco funding of certain studies. I find these remarks on 
where research “is coming from” to be entirely appropriate. It is important to 
know if a researcher is enmeshed in an organization with a strong commitment 
and orientation.
Benjamin C. Alamar is a Ph.D. economist and, at the time of  the article, was 
a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education, 
University of  California at San Francisco. Stanton A. Glantz received his Ph.D. in 
applied mathematics and is professor of  medicine at the same institution, the Cen-
ter for Tobacco Control Research and Education at UCSF.  In other words, both 
Alamar and Glantz were or are funded by anti-smoking sources. Glantz, moreover, 
is a well-known anti-smoking activist whose views have been covered by, among 
others, PBS.2 Glantz was prominent in the fight to end smoking in California res-
taurants and bars.  
My disclosure: Although I am a non-smoker who offered my daughter 
$2,000 if  she made it to age 21 without smoking (she did), I am also a defender 
of  people’s freedom in such matters. An article that I wrote in Fortune (Hender-
son 1997) led a law firm that defends tobacco companies to hire me as an expert 
witness. Although I withdrew early in the process, my withdrawal had nothing to 
do with the merits of  the tobacco company’s case, which I found to be just, and 
everything to do with my concluding that the law firm needed an historian, not 
an economist. 
seaRcHing foR exteRnalities
Consider an example. Suppose the law allows restaurants to decide their 
policy on allowing people with T-shirts, as opposed to shirts with a collar. Res-
taurant owners have three choices: (1) a no-T-shirt policy; (2) a policy that allows 
customers with T-shirts everywhere in the restaurant; and (3) a policy that limits 
customers with T-shirts to a section of  the restaurant. I know of  restaurants in the 
first two categories and certainly can conceive of  the third.  
Now, imagine that the government mandates that no restaurants be allowed 
to serve customers who wear T-shirts. For a restaurant that had previously banned 
T-shirts, there would be no direct loss; the law would simply prevent the restaurant 
owner from doing something he or she had already chosen not to do. Moreover, 
2 See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/interviews/glantz.html, accessed 
May 24, 2007.
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the restaurants in this category could benefit in the short run from such a man-
date. The reason is that some customers who would have gone to a restaurant that 
allows T-shirts and who, therefore, did not patronize the restaurant that banned 
them, would now have one less good reason to avoiding the restaurant that previ-
ously banned them.3 But the restaurants in the second and third categories would 
suffer a loss because they would be prevented from serving a segment of  custom-
ers that they wished to serve. If  an economist found that the government’s policy 
actually increased profits for restaurants and increased the resale value of  restau-
rants, other economists would want an explanation.
Now, let’s turn to smoking. One might think that the analysis is fundamen-
tally different because smoking is a health issue: smokers’ smoke affects the health, 
and certainly the comfort, of  non-smoking customers. But because these non-
smoking customers can choose whether or not to patronize a restaurant that al-
lows smoking, the restaurant owner can capture a normal share of  the value to 
them by disallowing smoking. If  other customers value a smoke-free experience 
enough, they will be willing to visit more frequently or even pay a premium for 
it. Thus, a restaurant owner can then weigh those extra payments against the lost 
business of  those who will shun the restaurant because they wish to smoke. The 
fact that second-hand smoking has a health dimension does not make it funda-
mentally different from T-shirts, which has a “second-hand” aesthetic dimension.
Of  course, not just other restaurant patrons are affected by smoke.  Waiters, 
waitresses, hosts, and hostesses are also affected. But they are quickly aware of  the 
restaurant’s smoking policy. Those who dislike working in a smoking restaurant 
will shun the job or, perhaps, take the job and receive a premium. Economists 
since Adam Smith have generally found that, all other things equal, a job with 
distasteful or risky aspects pays more than one without. To take one of  many 
examples, DeSimone and Schumacher (2004) find that a 10-percent increase in 
the AIDS rate raises the earnings of  registered nurses by about 0.8 percent. The 
restaurant owner can trade off  the gains from catering to smokers against the lost 
business from non-smokers and the pecuniary and search costs of  being staffed. 
Thus, there is a strong reason to believe that a law banning smoking would 
reduce the profits (and resale value) of  restaurants that otherwise would have al-
lowed smoking. Alamar and Glantz seem to recognize this reasoning when they 
write:
The tobacco industry, working through the hospitality industry, op-
poses these policies using the claim that smoke-free policies will harm 
the hospitality industry. In a world of  perfect information and effi-
cient markets operating with no externalities, this claim of  harm to 
the industry would make economic sense, because any regulation that 
3  I’m indebted to a referee for this point.  He noted the parallel between this point and my point later 
about restaurants that ban smoking before there is a government mandate.
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restricts an owner’s choice set would at best have no effect on profit-
ability. (520)
But immediately following this statement, the authors write:
In the real world of  imperfect information, external effects on con-
sumers and employees, or other forms of  market failure, however, a 
restriction on the choice set could increase profitability. (520)
It is hard to conceive of  external effects on consumers and employees that 
would vitiate my analysis above, which concludes that restrictions would hurt prof-
itability. Alamar and Glantz assert that externalities alter the situation, but they 
never really identify what those externalities are. Towards the end of  their article, 
they criticize an article by Dunham and Marlow (2000) that argues that the restau-
rant can act as an intermediary between smokers and non-smokers. Alamar and 
Glantz write:
[S]mokers and nonsmokers are not two well-defined groups but are 
rather numerous individuals with varied tolerances for smoke and 
willingness to refrain from smoking or to go outside to smoke.  Even 
if  the staff  of  the restaurant is ignored, the number of  interested 
parties is very large with greatly varied preferences in regard to the 
externality. The large number of  interested parties would cause nego-
tiation costs to be high, which violates the assumption of  low costs in 
the Coase theorem. (524)
The restaurant owner, however, no more need get huge numbers of  people 
with varying smoking preferences together to make bargains than he needs to get 
people together to decide the menu, the lighting, the music, and the air condition-
ing. In normal discussions of  negative externalities, it is costly for the sufferer not 
only to negotiate but also to exit. It is usually assumed that they are stuck in the 
“game,” and the emphasis is on the cost of  negotiation. But in the matter of  going 
to a restaurant, the parties in question can easily decide not to be party at all. They 
can drive to a different restaurant or eat at home. All the restaurant owner need do 
is decide on a policy, announce it to the world, and then see what happens.  
In using the word “externality,” Alamar and Glantz beg the question. That 
is, they assume that smoking in a restaurant is an externality when that claim is 
exactly what they need to establish.4    
4  Alamar and Glantz are not alone in this respect.  In his otherwise excellent textbook, Public 
Finance, Harvey S. Rosen writes:
Another type of inefficiency that may arise due to the nonexistence of a market is an 
externality, a situation in which one person’s behavior affects the welfare of another 
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Skeptics of  free markets might argue that market forces do not work the 
way I claim. But, if  so, their disagreement is almost as much with Alamar and 
Glantz as it is with me. If  non-smoking consumers are not willing to pay more, 
all other things equal, to sit in a non-smoking restaurant and if  non-smoking 
employees are not more willing to work (or not willing to work for less) at a non-
smoking restaurant, whence comes the gain in profitability from banning smok-
ing? Alamar and Glantz argue that some of  the gain would come from lower labor 
costs. Smoking, they argue, “is linked to increases in days lost due to illness and 
higher worker compensation costs” (520). In other words, Alamar and Glantz are 
arguing that ending smoking in restaurants would reduce days lost to illness and 
reduce worker compensation costs. But if  Alamar and Glantz are aware of  this, 
why would employers not be? Again, they have not established an effect that can 
reasonably be called “external.” They have not shown smoking has to be different, 
in any relevant way, from dress code, music volume, lighting, or air conditioning, 
to name just a few general conditions at a restaurant.
Alamar and Glantz seem to realize that their own reasoning requires a mar-
ket failure and that this assumed failure needs to be explained. After all, if  res-
taurant owners do not know their own interests, then there must be a reason 
that restaurant owners make systematic errors. Alamar and Glantz even refer to 
a survey of  restaurant and bar owners showing that they “were fearful of  smok-
ing restrictions” (525). The authors, however, do not place much weight on the 
beliefs of  entrepreneurs regarding matters directly connected to their personal 
motivation and local knowledge “because it is well documented that the tobacco 
industry regularly feeds misinformation to the hospitality industry to fight smoke-
free ordinances” (525; see also 520, 524). In other words, Alamar and Glantz claim 
that people in the hospitality industry are duped into not knowing where their true 
interests lie.  
How could individual restaurant owners be so easily duped into believing 
something that, if  acted on, hurts them? This seems implausible. Individual res-
taurant owners have business acumen. Moreover, surely the various restaurant 
owners’ associations would have an incentive to investigate whether going smoke-
less would lead to increased or decreased business. Alamar and Glantz do not 
in a way that is outside existing markets. For example, suppose your roommate be-
gins smoking large cigars, polluting the air and making you worse off. Why is this an 
efficiency problem? Your roommate consumes a scarce resource, clean air, when he 
smokers cigars. However there is no market for clean air that forces him to pay for it. 
(47, bold in original)
Yet elsewhere Rosen writes, “As long as someone owns a resource, its price reflects the value for alter-
native uses, and the resource is therefore used efficiently (at least in the absence of any other ‘market 
failures’).”  If the room in which the roommate smokes is privately owned, then there would appear 
to be no externality.  Similarly, because the air in a restaurant is owned by the restaurant owner, there 
is no externality.  Something about smoking seems to have made both Rosen and Alamar and Glantz 
give up standard economic reasoning.  
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attempt to explain how alleged misinformation from the tobacco industry could 
sway hospitality entrepreneurs in a way that would directly hurt their livelihood. 
Their conclusion that restaurant owners are fooled is unpersuasive.
empiRical issues
Alamar and Glantz use a data set on the sale of  restaurants to examine 
whether non-smoking laws had an effect on the ratio of  the sale price of  the 
restaurant to the restaurant’s annual gross revenues. They call it the price-to-sales 
ratio, P/S. They find that, all other things equal, having a restaurant in a smoke-
free location caused the ratio to be higher. On this basis, they reach the following 
conclusion:
A restaurant in a smoke-free location sold for a higher price (thus the 
higher P/S ratio) than a restaurant with the same sales in a smok-
ing location.  This smoke-free premium indicates that the businesses 
in smoke-free locales operate at a higher margin (i.e., more profits).  
(522)
But neither of  the sentences above follows from their empirical findings. 
First, they found that P/S was higher in a smoke-free location, not that P was 
higher. Recall that P is the sale price of  a restaurant and S is the restaurant’s gross 
annual revenues. Imagine that a no-smoking ordinance reduces sales of  a restau-
rant by 20 percent and reduces the price the restaurant sells for by 10 percent. 
Then P/S would rise, but that would not mean that the ordinance made restau-
rants more profitable. In fact, the ordinance would have made the restaurant less 
profitable. It is a simple mathematical fact that if  all one knows is that a ratio rose, 
one cannot tell whether the numerator rose. And to know the effect of  the ordi-
nance on profitability, one must know whether the numerator, P, rose or fell. 
There is a second problem in drawing Alamar’s and Glantz’s conclusion 
from their empirical finding. In laying out the reasoning in the previous paragraph, 
I wrote as if  the authors had found that P/S rose after a non-smoking ordinance 
was passed. But they didn’t find that. What they found is that, all other things 
equal, P/S was higher in areas with no-smoking ordinances. So even if  P were 
higher in such areas, one would not know that P was higher due to the ordinance. 
To know that, one would have to do a before-and-after study to see the effect of  
a non-smoking ordinance—something the authors did not do.
Even if  smoking bans do increase restaurant profitability—something that 
the authors did not demonstrate—this could be due to a reduction in competition. 
Just as preventing the import of  textiles makes domestic textile producers more 
profitable than otherwise, so banning restaurants that allow smoking could make 
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the restaurants that survive more profitable. This possibility is one that Alamar 
and Glantz do not consider. But if  this is what in fact occurred, it would not fol-
low that restaurant owners as a whole should, in their own self-interest, advocate 
no-smoking laws. Pakistani producers of  textiles are hurt by U.S. government re-
strictions on textile imports and would therefore not advocate such restrictions. 
So, also, if  owners of  restaurants that allow smoking are hurt by restrictions on 
smoking, they should not be expected to advocate such laws.   
tHe foRgotten RestauRants
Alamar and Glantz push the idea that anti-smoking ordinances are good for 
restaurant owners. They do a Monte Carlo simulation that tells how much better 
owners do (in terms of  P/S ratio) in smoke-free places than in places without 
the restrictions. But the whole logic ignores that the restrictions eliminated cer-
tain restaurants from existence. In the restricted locations, those restaurants have 
dropped out of  the sample, and their losses are ignored. The article abstract be-
gins: “This study estimates the value added to a restaurant by a smoke-free policy 
…,” as though the result tells what an average restaurant could expect in added 
value from the new government policy. But that is not actually what the investiga-
tion does.
tHe foRgotten consumeRs
Alamar and Glantz confine their investigation to ratio of  restaurant price to 
sales.  But Alamar and Glantz fail to acknowledge the consumers. Consumers who 
prefer smoking would lose.  
How about voluntaRy alteRnatives?
Again, Alamar’s and Glantz’s favored explanation for the economic conun-
drum is that restaurant owners are duped by the tobacco industry.  In Alamar’s and 
Glantz’s view, it was in the restaurant owners’ interests all along to ban smoking, 
but they didn’t realize it. But if  this were the true explanation, there is an obvious 
voluntary solution: enlighten the unenlightened. If  Alamar and Glantz are correct, 
then restaurant owners, once informed, would voluntarily make their restaurants 
smoke-free and gain a competitive advantage, with both customers and employees, 
over their smoky rivals. To hold that force is needed, Alamar and Glantz must be-
lieve not only that restaurant owners are misguided, but also that they are incorri-
gibly so. And, if  restaurants owners do not voluntarily act on Alamar and Glantz’s 
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findings, which should we doubt more: the prudence of  the restaurant owners 
or, despite its being chosen as the Western Economic Association International’s 
“Best Article of  2004”, the wisdom of  their article?
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